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Abstract
Node.js is a popular JavaScript server-side frame-
work with an efficient runtime for cloud-based event-
driven architectures. Its strength is the presence
of thousands of third party libraries which allow
developers to quickly build and deploy applications.
These very libraries are a source of security threats
as a vulnerability in one library can (and in some
cases did) compromise one’s entire server.
In order to support the least-privilege integration
of libraries we develop NodeSentry, the first se-
curity architecture for server-side JavaScript. Our
policy enforcement infrastructure supports an easy
deployment of web-hardening techniques and access
control policies on interactions between libraries and
their environment, including any dependent library.
Introduction
JavaScript has many advantages for web develop-
ment [9], as it is the de facto dominant language for
client-side applications and it offers the flexibility of
dynamic languages. Recently it also achieved an un-
deniable solid foothold at the server-side, illustrated
by the rapidly growing community of developers and
support from industry. Among the various event-
driven programming languages, Node.js is a widely
successful platform that combines the JavaScript
language with an efficient runtime, tailored for a
cloud-based event-driven architecture [17].
In particular, JavaScript supports the easy (and
often necessary) combination or mash-up of content
and libraries from disparate third parties. Such flex-
ibility comes at a price of significant security and
integrity problems [16], and researchers have pro-
posed a number of solutions to address these prob-
lems, either using language-based sandboxing [18, 1],
information flow control [5, 6, 3], or web browser
modifications that enforce user- or server-provided
access control policies [14, 19, 22]. Bielova [4] pro-
vides an extensive survey.
However, these proposals for client-side JavaScript
cannot be lifted to server-side applications. Some
client-side measures are embedded in a web browser,
or they command a significant overhead acceptable
at client-side but not at server-side. For example,
Meyerovich’s et al., [14] report some of the best
micro-benchmarks for client-side JavaScript and still
report an overhead between 24% to 300% of the raw
time.
At the server-side, security problems are magni-
fied: applications run without sandboxing and serve
a large number of clients simultaneously. Server
processes must handle load without interruptions
for extended periods of time. Any corruption of
the global state, whether unintentional or induced
by an attacker, can be disastrous. Unfortunately,
JavaScript features make it easy to slip and intro-
duce security vulnerabilities which may allow a di-
version of the control flow or even complete server
poisoning. Hence, developers should be cautious
when developing server applications in JavaScript.
Yet the current trend is to build up one’s application
by loading (dynamically) a large number of third
party libraries.
How to check all these libraries for potential vulner-
abilities? Server-side JavaScript is more static than
client-side JavaScript, so one may hope that static
analysis might work. Unfortunately, the dynamic
nature of the JavaScript language makes static anal-
ysis of JavaScript packages extremely difficult: only
a handful of frameworks for static analysis can deal
with exceptions and dynamic calls [12, 11]. Also
the large number of libraries to be considered (and
modeled) is a major hurdle. For example JAM re-
quires modeling such dependencies in Prolog [10].
Runtime monitoring seems the only alternative if it
can scale up to hundreds or thousands of concurrent
requests.
How do we combine the flexibility of loading third-
party libraries from a vibrant ecosystem with strong
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security guarantees at an acceptable performance
price? There is essentially no academic work ad-
dressing the problem of server-side JavaScript secu-
rity. Our work targets this gap.
Threat Model
The server-side scenario assumes that libraries are
actually executed on the server with server privileges.
Hence, we assume non-malicious libraries, although
potentially vulnerable and exploitable (semi-trusted).
Because of vulnerabilities, they might end up doing
something that they were not intended to do. A
prototypical example is the st library, used to host
static files, which was found to be vulnerable to a
directory traversal attack.1
The purpose of our security model is to shield the
semi-trusted libraries from some of the other li-
braries loaded in the package which may offer a
functionality that we consider core. For example
we may want to filter access by the semi-trusted
library to the trusted library offering access to the
file system.
We consider outright malicious libraries out of
scope from our threat model, albeit one could use
NodeSentry equally well to fully isolate a mali-
cious library. We believe that the effort to write
policies for all other possible libraries to be isolated
from the malicious one would outweigh the effort
of writing the alleged benign functionalities of the
malicious library from scratch.
NodeSentry
The key idea of our proposal, called NodeSentry,
is to use a variant of an inline reference monitor [20,
8] as modified for the Security-by-Contract approach
for Java and .NET [7] in order to make it more
flexible. Specifically, we do not embed the monitor
into the code as suggested by most approaches for
inline reference monitors but inline only hooks in
a few key places, while the monitor itself is an
external component. In our case this has the added
advantage of potentially improving performance (a
key requirement for server-side code) as the monitor
can now run in a separate thread and threads that
do not call security relevant actions are unaffected.
Further, and maybe most important, we do not
limit ourselves to purely raising security exceptions
1https://nodesecurity.io/advisories/st_directory_
traversal & http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?
name=CVE-2014-3744
and stopping the execution but support policies
that specify how to “fix” the execution; the ability
to continue executing after security errors is an
essential requirement for server-side applications.
In order to maintain control over all references ac-
quired by the library, e.g., via a call to "require",
NodeSentry applies the membrane pattern, origi-
nally proposed by Miller [15, §9] and further refined
by Van Cutsem and Miller [23]. The goal of a mem-
brane is to fully isolate two object graphs [15, 23].
Intuitively, a membrane creates a shadow object
that is a “clone” of the target object that it wishes
to protect. Only the references to the shadow object
are passed further to callers. Any access to the shad-
owed object is then intercepted and either served
directly or eventually reflected on the target object
through handlers. In this way, when a membrane
revokes a reference, essentially by destroying the
shadow object [23], it instantly achieves the goal of
transitively revoking all references as advocated by
Miller [15].
Security Policies
We have identified two possible points where the
policy hooks can be placed. These coincide with two
distinct types of policies: on the public interface of
the library itself with the outer world, on the public
interface of any depending library (both built-in,
core libraries and other third-party libraries), or in
both places.
Upper-bound policies are set on each member
of the public interface of a library with the outer
world. Those interfaces are used by the rest of the
application to interact with it. It is the ideal lo-
cation to do all kinds of security checks before the
library code is executed, or right after the library
returns. For example, these checks can be used
(i) to implement web application firewalls and pre-
vent malformed or maliciously crafted URLs from
entering the library or (ii) to implement a num-
ber of security checks used for web-hardening, like
e.g., enabling the HTTP Strict-Transport-Security
header [13], set the Secure and/or HttpOnly Cook-
ies flags [2] or configure a Content Security Policy
(CSP) [21]. Another example of a useful policy
would be to block specific clients from accessing
specific files via the web server.
Lower-bound policies can be installed on the
public interface of any depending library, both built-
in core libraries (like e.g., "fs" for file system access)
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Figure 1: NodeSentry allows policies to be in-
stalled on the public interface (Upper-Bound) of
the library to be secured (indicated by the gray
rectangle that shows the inner dependency graph)
and on the public interface of any depending library
(Lower-Bound)
or any other third-party library. Such a policy could
enforce e.g., an application-wide chroot jail or a fine-
grained access control policy such as restrict reading
to a specific set of files or prevent all write actions.
Figure 1 depicts interactions with these two types
of policies with the red arrows and highlights the
isolated context or membrane with a grey box. The
amount of available policy points is thus a trade-off
between performance (less points mean less checks)
and security (more points mean a more fine-grained
policy).
Conclusions
Among the various server-side framework, Node.js
has emerged as one of the most popular frameworks.
Its strengths are the use of JavaScript, an efficient
runtime tailored for cloud-based event parallelism,
and thousands of third-party libraries.
Yet, these libraries are also a source of potential
security threats. Since the server runs with full priv-
ileges, a vulnerability in one library can compromise
one’s entire server. This is indeed what recently
happened with the "st" library used by the popular
web server libraries to serve static files.
In order to address the problem of least privi-
lege integration of third party libraries we develop
NodeSentry, a novel server-side JavaScript secu-
rity architecture that supports such least-privilege
integration of libraries, and that builds on the im-
plementation of membranes.
Our enforcement infrastructure can support a sim-
ple and uniform implementation of security rules,
starting from traditional web-hardening techniques
to custom security policies on interactions between
libraries and their environment, including any de-
pendent library.
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